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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
THE EARLY VESTING RULE IN WISCONSIN
"The law favors early vesting"' or words to similar effect are
frequently found in Wisconsin will construction cases. In this comment
the objective will be to examine Wisconsin future interests law so as
to properly categorize and explain the early vesting rule.
Will of Walker2 caused some confusion in the area of will con-
struction because the Wisconsin Supreme Court, apparently without
clear intent of the testator, found a future interest in a class gift
vested subject to complete defeasance.3 Whether or not the early
vesting rule has been changed by this case will be our chief concern.
Future interests can be of several types, i.e. remainders, reversions,
executory interests, possibilities of reverter, and rights of entry for
breach of condition.4
In the Walker case the future interest is a remainder. Isabel R.
Walker died testate and created a testamentary trust which provided
that income was to be paid to her grandnephews and grandnieces. The
corpus of the trust was to be distributed to the grandchildren when
the youngest reached fifty years of age. The testatrix's words were:
The remainder of my estate is then to be held in trust until
such time as the youngest of my great-nephews and nieces is
fifty (50) years old. At the time the youngest great-nephew or
niece is fifty years old the residue of my estate is to be divided
among them all share and share alike. (A footnote by the court
indicates that the prefix "great" was meant by the testatrix to
refer to that relationship indicated by the use of the prefix
"grand.") 5
At the time the will was drawn, the testatrix's two sisters, two
nephews and five grandnephews and grandnieces were living. The
youngest grandchild was seven years old and the oldest eighteen years
old. The testatrix died in 1947 survived by her two nephews and
12 WISCONSIN PROBATE LAW AND PRACTICE §15.64 (1959).
2 17 Wis. 2d 181, 116 N.W. 2d 106 (1962).
3 RESTATEMENT, PROPERrY §157 (1936) classifies remainders as:
(a) indefeasibly vested.(b) vested subject to open.
(c) vested subject to complete defeasance.(d) subject to a condition precedent.§157, comment o defines defeasance as a word used "... to describe not only
the ending of an interest in accordance with its terms, as for example, by
the expiration of its stipulated duration as in accordance with the terms of a
special limitation, but also the cutting short of an interest, as for example,
the ending of an interest by a power of termination or by an executory limita-
tion. The word defeasance is thus broader in its inclusions than the word
divestment which applies only to the ending of the interest by the cutting short
thereof."
The words "defeasance" and "divestment" are often used interchangeably
in the cases and treatises.
4 SIMES & SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS §64 (2d ed. 1956).
5 Will of Walker, 17 Wis. 2d 181, 183, 116 N.W. 2d 106, 107 (1962).
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seven grandchildren raging from seventeen to forty-one years of age.
In 1960, one of testatrix's grandnieces died, survived by her hus-
band and two daughters. Thereupon the trustee, representing the
six surviving grandnephews, petitioned for a construction of testatrix's
will to determine if the heirs of the deceased grandniece were entitled
to share in the trust's distributions of income and corpus. Since the
testatrix's two nephews were still living, a guardian ad litem was
appointed to represent the interests of unborn grandnephews and
grand nieces.
In affirming the lower court decision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
considered a number of arguments. Those favoring affirmance were:
1. Based on the ages of the grandchildren, both at the time
of drafting the will and the time of the testatrix's death, and
considering possible future events from those points in time, it
was unlikely that the testatrix could have foreseen anything
other than a long-term trust, the specific beneficiaries of which
were not determined.6
2. The testatrix's use of the word "them" in her will can
only have "great-nephews and nieces" as its antecedent. Thus
one not meeting that description should be excluded. Also, the
fact that no substitutional provisions are made for deceased
grandchildren would seem to indicate that only grandchildren
should be eventual recipients.
3. The words "share and share alike" signify a per capita
and not a per stirpes distribution.7
4. A construction that will insure the transmission of the
trust estate to blood relatives is preferred.8
5. Class gifts to an undetermined class shall pass only to
those members of the class in existence at the time the class is
determined.9
6. When coupled with other facts, class gifts in which the
class may increase or decrease have a tendency to show that
the testator intended to imply a condition that recipients survive
until the time for distribution.1 0
Arguments favoring reversal were:
1. Where a gift of income accompanies a gift of corpus,
the law favors a construction that the gift of corpus is a vested
interest.
6Id. at 189, 116 N.W. 2d at 110. The court stated: "Rather the inference is
fairly strong that she desired a long-term trust extending over a great many
years during which her estate was to be kept intact."
Will of Bray, 260 Wis. 9, 49 N.W. 2d 716 (1961).
s 5 AimucAN LAw OF PRoPRT §21.3 (1952).
0 Will of Friend, 259 Wis. 501, 49 N.W. 2d 423 (1951).
10 Sims & SMrrH, op. cit. suepra note 4, §656.
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2. The law favors a construction which results in an abso-
lutely vested interest rather than a defeasibly vested one.
In connection with this preference for absolute vesting the court
said:
The preference for absolute vesting originated in connection
with conveyances of interest in land and at a time in feudal
England when contingent interests in land had not attained a
dignified nature. 5 American Law of Property, p. 130, sec. 21.3.
It was based upon the desirability of a definitely ascertained
placement of an interest as opposed to a suspension thereof
pending some contingency. This rationale is still appropriate to
support a preference for a vested, rather than a contingent in-
terest. However, because of the wide use of the trust device
this rationale does not lend any support to the preference for
absolute rather than defeasible vesting. Therefore, it is doubtful
if this rule should continue to have vitality when applied to
beneficial interests in a trust where title is at all times vested in
the trustee. This is in accord with the view expressed in the
above cited text that adherence to this preference in modern
times "is at least of doubtful validity in many situations.",',
It would be incorrect to say that any one of these factors con-
trolled the decision; obviously the joint impact of all of them resulted
in the court's decision. Note, however, that the court has not mentioned
a rule of construction which favors vested interests over contingent
interests despite the existence of a Wisconsin statute defining the two
terms.
Future estates are either vested or contingent. They are
vested when there is a person in being who would have an
immediate right, by virtue of it, to the possession of the lands
upon the ceasing of the intermediate or precedent estate. They
are contingent whilst the person to whom, or the event upon
which they are limited to take effect remains uncertain. 12
Rundell, in his introduction to the Wisconsin real property statutes
strongly contended that this statute was of little help in solving vesting
problems.
The question of the conditions upon which a given person
is entitled to the possession of certain land, through a convey-
ance, is ordinarily a question of construction. Under the present
Wisconsin statutes, all questions of vesting are of this character.
Section 230.13 can be of no aid in answering them. It should
never have been adopted. It should now be repealed. Until it is,
it cannot be completely ignored, although the court, after earlier
trouble with it, has come to minimize its effect.13
11 Will of Walker, supra note 5, at 190, 116 N.W. 2d at 111.
12 WIs. STAT. 230.13 (1961). This provision first appeared in REv. STAT. ch. 56
(1849), which was renumbered REv. STAT. §2037 (1878). By Wis. Laws 1931,
ch. 72, §2 the words "by virtue of it" were added.
13 Wis. STAT. ANN., ch. 230 (Introduction) (1957).
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Unlike New York,14 from whose laws our statute is derived, the
Wisconsin statute applies only to realty.' 5 An early writer thought
that the New York revisers intended to change the common law defi-
nitions of vested and contingent.' 6 More recent opinions state that the
definitions in the statute and the common law definitions were intended
to be the same. 7
On its face the statute does not purport to include remainders
vested subject to complete defeasance. However, the following cases,
considered in chronological order, both mention the statute and recog-
nize such a remainder. Apparently, the early case of Scott v. West
represents the first appearance, in Wisconsin, of a remainder vested
subject to complete defeasance. In that case the testator provided:
After the death of my said daughters, Mary and Kate, I give
devise and bequeath all the residue and remainder of my
property, real and personal, to my surviving grandchildren, and
to the legal issue of any deceased grandchild or grandchildren,
and to their heirs and assigns, forever, in equal parts.'
Holding the grandchildren's future interests vested subject to complete
defeasance, the court stated:
So bequests of legacies and personal property when the
payment or distribution is to be made at a future time certain to
arrive, and not subject to a condition precedent, are deemed
vested when there is a person in being at the time of the testa-
tor's death, capable of taking when the time arrives even though
his interest is liable to be divested by dying without issue or
diminished by future births .... '1 In other words, each such
grandchild became, at once, on the death of the testator (or its
subsequent birth), the owner of an equitable interest in a frac-
tional share of the corpus of such personal estate and such own-
ership must ultimately ripen into and become an absolute legal
14 N.Y. REAL PRop. LAW §40 (Note I, No. 8).
'
5 In re Albiston's Estate, 117 Wis. 272, 276, 94 N.W. 169, 170 (1903). In this
case the court stated: "It ought to be said that it seems clear that there was
error in that case referring to sec. 2037, Stats. 1898, as in any way having a
bearing thereon. That case, like the present, was clearly a case of equitable
conversion, and hence the bequests were bequests of personalty."
'
6 FULTON, THE REAL PRoPERTY LAW OF THE STATE OF NEW YoRic §40, at 232
(3d ed. 1909). See also Annot., 131 A.L.R. 712, 722 (1941).
"7Brake, The "Vested vs. Contingent" Approach to Future Interest-A Critical
Analysis of the Michigr n Cases, 9 U. Dar. LJ. 61, 66 (1946). The author
states: "A few states have adopted statutory definitions of vested and con-
tingent interests. While it may well be doubted whether the statutes were ever
intended to modify the common law in this respect, some courts have decided
that this has been their effect. The later cases exhibit a tendency to veer back
to the common law distinctions. In a few instances in states lacking similar
statutes, their courts have thought that the statutory distinctions were de-
claratory of the common law, and have treated them as such. There is no
doubt but that the statutes have contributed in some measure to the difficulty
of distinguishing remainders."
is Scott v. West, 63 Wis. 529, 533, 24 N.W. 161, 161 (1885).
19 Id. at 571, 24 N.W. at 173.
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title, with the right to immediate possession and this can only
be defeated or divested by the death of such grandchild without
issue, before the determination or execution of the trusts and
rights given to and imposed upon the executors of the will.20
Here is one of the most common dispositive provisions which is often
times construed to create a remainder subject to complete defeasance,
viz., a gift to X subject to being defeated if X dies without issue. Since
the cardinal rule of all will construction is intention of the testator,21
the next step is to attempt the discovery of such intent. Although it
is difficult to assess the persuasive power of the language on this
decision, the court does find some intent expressed in the testator's
words.
But the class which is thus made the object of the testator's
gifts, devises and bequests is not limited to such "surviving
grandchildren," but extends by way of representation "to the
legal issue" of any pre-deceased grandchild or grandchildren.
By that clause of the will, the testator in effect, on the death of
both of his daughters, gave, devised and bequeathed "all the
residue and remainder" of his property, real and personal to
such of his grandchildren as should then be living, and to the
legal issue of any pre-deceased grandchild, "and to their heirs
and assigns, forever, in equal parts."22
This case then would seem to support the contention that a court may
find sufficient intent expressed by the testator so as to postpone enjoy-
ment, but still may construe the interest as vested, thus allowing for
the delayed enjoyment by providing that the vested interest is subject
to complete defeasance. The court further provides:
The direction, that if any grandchildren shall have died be-
fore final division, leaving children, they shall take and re-
ceive per stirpes the share of estate both real and personal,
which their parents would have been entitled to have and receive
if then living, was evidently intended merely to provide for chil-
dren of a deceased grandchild and not to define the nature, as
vested or contingent, of the previous general gift to the grand-
children; and its only effect upon that gift is to divest the shares
of any grandchild deceased, leaving issue, and to vest that share
in such issue.23
Overlooking the fact that in Walker there was no such gift over, (only
the inherent gift over present in a class gift) the same reasoning would
seem to be applicable. Apparently the statutory definition influenced
the court because they continue:
From the authorities cited it is obvious that the words "after
the death of my said daughters," in the fourth clause of the
20 Id. at 573, 24 N.W. at 174.
212 WiscoNsiN PROBATE LAW AND PRAcTIcE §15.55 (1959).
22 Scott v. West, supra note 18, at 563, 24 N.W. at 169.
23 Id. at 569, 24 N.W. at 172.
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will, at least as to the real estate of which the testator died
seized, refer to the time when the grandchildren will come into
complete possession and enjoyment, and not to the time of
vesting of the remainder in fee in them. In other words, the
clause in effect devised such real estate directly upon the death
of the testator, to the grandchildren, born or to be born, and to
the legal issue of any predeceased grandchild, subject, of
course, to the dispositions made in other portions of the will to
the daughters, as executors in trust and otherwise, during their
lives and the life of the survivor of them. It follows that the
devise of land to the grandchildren, etc., by that clause of the
will, must be construed to convey to them all the estate of the
testator therein which he could lawfully devise, except in so
far as it appears by other portibns of the will as above indicated
that the devisor intended to convey a less estate, Sec. 2278 R.S.;
In re Estate of Pierce, 56 Wis. 565; Newman v. Waterman,
post. p. 612. Such devise is denominated by the statute as a
future estate, because it is limited to commence in possession
at a future day on the determination of a precedent estate
created at the same time and upon which it is dependent, and
hence is termed a remainder, Secs. 2033-2035, R.S. And since
as we have seen, there were persons in being at the time of
the testator's death who would have had an immediate right to
the possession of the lands upon the ceasing of the intermediate
or precedent estate, it follows that the estate was a vested re-
mainder. Of course the remainder thus vested must open and
let in after-born grandchildren, and the legal issue of any pre-
deceased grandchild, by way of representation, and is liable to
be divested as to any grandchildren dying without issue during
the lives of the daughters.
24
Note that the second last sentence of this quote reads almost the same
as statute 230.13.
In Baker v. Estate of McLeod the testator placed his estate in
trust, the income and required portions of the corpus to be paid for
and toward the maintenance and education of his daughter. He further
provided:
And I further order, direct and declare that all my aforesaid
estate, or the proceeds thereof, with the rents, profits, and income
thereof, so far as the same shall not have been paid or applied
as aforesaid shall be paid and transferred to my said child, the
said Annie May McLeod, as and when she shall attain the age
of twenty-one years. But, if the said Annie May McLeod shall
die under the age of twenty-one years, then all my aforesaid
estate, or proceeds thereof, with the rents, profits, and income
thereof, so far as not then paid, applied or required for the
purposes aforesaid, shall immediately after her death, be paid,
applied, and disposed of in the manner following, that is to say:
(testator then provided two fixed amount bequests.) 25
24 Id. at 570, 24 N.W. at 172.
25 Baker v. McLeod, 79 Wis. 534, 535, 48 N.W. 657, 657 (1891).
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Subsequent to her father's death, Annie May McLeod died under the
age of twenty-one but was survived by her son. It was held that upon
the death of the testator, the estate vested in Annie, subject only to the
condition subsequent that, if she died under the age of twenty-one
years, without issue, then the gifts over would become effective.
In Brown v. Higgins, the testator gave his son Frederick a life
estate in a farm, but provided:
And in the event of the said Frederick's having an heir or
heirs, then on the death of the said Frederick I give and devise
all of said lands herein described to him or them and their heirs
and assigns forever. But in the event of the said Frederick's
dying without leaving any legal heir or heirs, then I hereby devise
and bequeath said lands, each and every of them to my own
heirs at law, to have and to hold the same unto them and their
heirs and assigns forever.28
The court rejected appellant's contention that the intent evidenced by
these words was one postponing the granting of the remainder until
Frederick's death, and, citing the Wisconsin statutory definitions,
affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that upon the testator's
death the future estate vested in his then heirs subject to being divested
if Frederick died leaving heirs. This case would seem to be authority
for the statement that the term vested, as used in the statute, encom-
passes interests vested subject to complete defeasance.
In Will of Greene the testator created a testamentary trust and
provided that upon termination of the trust, the residue of his estate in-
cluding the trust property was to pass to his four children in equal
shares. The will further provided:
In the event of the decease of any of my said children be-
fore his or her shares shall be paid, then the issue of such de-
ceased child or children shall take the share of their deceased
parent, and in the event any of my said children shall die without
issue surviving, his or her share shall be paid to such of my
said children as shall be paid to such of my said children as shall
be living and the issue of any of said children as may be de-
ceased.21
The court then quoted from Will of Roth28 and the material from Law
Reports Annotated therein:
... [I]t is well settled that where a future gift is postponed
in order to let in some other interest or, as it is sometimes
expressed, for the benefit of the estate, the gift is vested al-
though the enjoyment is postponed. Note, L.R.A. 1915C, 1049.29
The court then stated that:
26 Brown v. Higgins, 180 Wis. 253, 254, 193 N.W. 84, 84 (1923).
27 Will of Greene, 240 Wis. 452, 458, 3 N.W. 2d 704, 705 (1942).
28 Will of Roth, 191 Wis. 366, 210 N.W. 826 (1926).
29 Id. at 371, 210 N.W. at 827.
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There is here no doubt that the postponement of the gift was
entirely for the benefit of the estate. 3 ... We are of the opinion
that the rights of the children of the testator vested at the death.
of the testator, subject to be divested upon the contingency of
death of a child prior to receipt of his or her share.3 1
The trust property consisted of testator's stock in several corporations
and the land on which one of the corporations was located, but statute
230.13 was not mentioned.
The remainder which would otherwise be vested is not made
contingent because the life tenant may, if necessary, consume the
corpus; rather this results in a defeasance of the vested interest.32
Estate of Wadleigh 3 3 held that this defeasance was only to the extent
of the life tenant's exercised right of encroachment.
A further extension of the usual vesting problem may occur because
of a slight change in the testator's language and the occurrence of an
unusual fact situation. In Will of Coleman, testator was survived by his
wife, three brothers and one sister but that sister and all of her children
died before testator's widow. His will granted a life estate to his wife
and individual remainders to his sister and brothers. He then provided:
And in case of the death of my said sister or either of my
said brothers before the death of my said wife, the share that
he or she would have taken shall be divided equally between his
or her surviving children, by right of representation.3 4
First the court, relying on the testator's intent, determined the extent
of the sister's and brother's interests.
By the language in the second sentence of the residuary clause
that . . . the said interests of the testator's brothers and sisters
were made subject to-be divested on the condition subsequent
that of prior to the death of the testator's wife one of said lega-
tees died leaving surviving children, such legatee's interest would
be divided equally between his or her surviving children, by
right of representation.3 5
The next question was whether the death of the sister's children
before the widow caused their interest to be defeated. It was argued
that the defeated interests should be the subject of an implied gift over
to the other remaindermen. However, the court determined that:
There are three ancestors; there are three distinct gifts over;
and there is no relation between the three in the application of
30 Will of Greene, supra note 27, at 459, 3 N.W. 2d at 707.
31 Id. at 458, 3 N.W. 2d at 707.
32Estate of Downs, 243 Wis. 303, 305, 9 N.W. 2d 822, 822 (1943). See also
2 WiscoxsIu PROBATE LAW AND PRAcTicE §15.65 (1959).
33250 Wis. 284, 26 N.W. 2d 667 (1946).
3 Will of Coleman, 253 Wis. 91, 93, 33 N.W. 2d 237, 239 (1947).
35 Id. at 96, 33 N.W. 2d at 240.
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the testamentary direction. Hence, there is nothing in the words
"by right of representation" which can be considered to indi-
cate that the words "surviving children" means "children surviv-
ing the death of the widow.13 6
There are a large number of cases in the Wisconsin reports holding
remainders vested, but they should not be considered as contra to the
cases just discussed because frequently the fact situation does not re-
quire a determination as to possible defeasance of the interest 37
Some of the cases previously discussed have concerned gifts to
individuals and some have concerned class gifts. This variance in factual
background makes no difference when considering the problem of sur-
vival.38
Several writers have recently considered defeasibly and indefeasibly
vested future interests. This general definition has been offered:
For a remainder to be vested absolutely it must be created
in favor of an identifiable remainderman; it must be capable of
becoming a possessory interest at the proper moment, and it must
be free from any condition or limitation whatever. Though a
remainder be created in favor of an identifiable person and be
capable of becoming a possessory estate at the proper moment,
if it has annexed to it a condition subsequent, special limitation
or executory limitation, it is accorded legal attributes somewhat
at variance with remainder vested absolutely, and, must, for some
purposes, be accorded a separate category.3 9
A remainder vested subject to complete defeasance resulted from
the common law draftsmen blending two separate techniques. Recogniz-
ing these techniques and the fact that they are distinct explains why the
interest is considered vested before the defeasance occurs.
Before the Statute of Uses (1536) and Wills (1540) remain-
ders defeasibly vested must have been rare, if used at all. As soon
as shifting executory interests were recognized as permissible
interests in property, the practice of annexing executory limita-
tions to vested remainders became common. The annexation of
a condition subsequent, special limitation or executory limitation
to an otherwise vested remainder does not affect the vested
character of such remainder, for so long as it continues as a
remainder it is ready to become effective as a possessory estate
whenever and however the particular estate terminates. Though
the defeasing contingency be such that it may defeat the re-
mainder either before or after becoming a possessory estate the
vested character as such is not affected thereby.40
Some general reasons have been advanced as to why a court might
36Id. at 99, 33 N.W. 2d at 242.37 Annot., 47 A.L.R. 2d 900 (1956).
382 PowELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §326, at 718 (1950).




prefer to interpret a testator's language as creating an interest subject
to defeasance.
The preference for vested interests has, however, a second
aspect: a preference for defeasibly vested interests, rather than
for interests subject to a condition precedent. In this situation
it is clear that the transferor has manifested an intention that the
property be finally enjoyed only by beneficiaries who meet some
condition imposed by him. The question is whether the condition
is precedent or is to operate as a divesting contingency.
Unlike the preference for indefeasibly vested interests, this
second aspect of the preference for vested interests may be an
important means of effectuating, in some situations, the inten-
tion of transferors. The determination that an interest is de-
feasibly vested, rather than contingent, means that it will not be
subject to any of the unfavorable characteristics inherent in con-
tingent interests at common law which may still be recognized in
the jurisdiction. Furthermore, the holder of defeasibly vested
future interest may be entitled to beneficial enjoyment pending
the performance of the condition while the holder of a contingent
interest is not. At the same time the determination that an in-
terest is defeasibly vested rather than contingent, does not sub-
stantially- affect the ultimate ownership of the subject matter
of the gift, since on the non-occurrence of the condition applic-
able to the interest the enjoyment of the property will terminate
just as if the condition bad been precedent, rather than subse-
quent."'
Classification based on the difference between the purely form dis-
tinctions of a condition precedent or condition subsequent has been long
criticized, but at least in the area of future interests, their continued
presence seems inescapable. 42
Areas in which there is a practical difference between denoting an
interest contingent instead of vested subject to complete defeasance
are few.
There are some questions with respect to which it is essential
to determine whether the remainder is subject to a condition
precedent or is vested subject to complete defeasance. The law of
acceleration is one example. The rule against perpetuities some-
times requires this decision. The necessity for this secondary
decision is relatively infrequent. When it is necessary, the char-
acter of the requirement of survival commonly supplies the
answer.
43
With respect to estate taxation, the difference is apparently irrelevant;
the test being the existence of the condition of survivorship, not form.
44
415 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §21.31 (1952).
42 Halbach, Future Interests: Express and Implied Conditions of Survival, Part
II, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 431, 462 (1961).
43 2 POWELL, op. cit. supra note 38, at 716.4 Halbach, supra note 42, at 461. The author states: "For the purposes of estate
taxation, too, the issue of whether a future interest is to be included in the
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The significance of a condition precedent or a condition subsequent
is diminished in Wisconsin because of the presence of Wisconsin
statute 230.13 Although recent years have seen the statute rarely cited,
theoretically all future interests including realty should be tested with
it. In In re Moran's Will,45 the court discussed the interrelationship of
the term vested per the statute and vested at common law; it decided
that there was a difference and held that a future interest could be both
vested and contingent. This apparent contradiction has been explained
as a failure to distinguish between remainders absolutely vested and
those vested subject to complete defeasance. 46 A Wisconsin Attorney
General's report seems to reinforce this contention.
In re Moran's Will, 118 Wis. 177, discusses contingent and
vested interests fully. The case is authority for the statement that
what might have been merely a contingent interest at common
law is, under the statute a vested interest subject to be divested.
This case is authority also for the rule that the law favors vesting
of estates.
47
The scope of the statute is probably not as broad as first impression
would lead one to believe. As previously mentioned it is limited to real
property and, in addition, as one law review commissioner suggests:
In this state [Wisconsin] then, the remainder is simultane-
ously vested and contingent, depending on the purpose for which
it is being considered. This seems to be the happiest solution
under the express language of the statute.48 (Brackets added.)
Such a solution is supported by Fulton's statement of the probable in-
tent of the New York revisers.
The distinction between "vested" and "contingent" rights or
estates, is of the first importance in the law of property. The
revisers probable purpose in defining "vested" and "contingent"
had, no doubt, immediate reference to the subsequent section
relating to the unlawful suspension of the power of alienation.49
Practical problems of determining whether a given future interest
is indefeasibly vested, vested subject to complete defeasance, or con-
tingent have not been answered by the Walker case. A recent note in
the Wisconsin Law Review suggested that the Walker case has affected
the persuasive effect of the rule -favoring early vesting.
The preference for early vesting has been followed by the
courts and relied upon by attorneys in Wisconsin for years. After
estate of a remainderman who dies before possession turns on the question of
descendability, which depends on the existence or non-existence of a condition
of survivorship, not on its form."
45 In re Moran's Will, 118 Wis. 177, 96 N.W. 367 (1903).
46 Simes & Smith, op. cit. supra note 4, §162.
4720 Ops. ATr'y GEN. 643 (1931).
4 Lawler, Remainder Conditioned Upon Survivorship, 15 TEMP. L. Q. 107, 121(1940).
49 FULTON, op. cit. supra note 16, at 230.
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the Walker case one wonders about the present strength of the
construction rule. In the past, courts have used the rule to re-
solve the problems created when a testator's intention was not
expressed. From the court's treatment of the early vesting rule
in the Walker case, it appears that the canon has been relegated
to a position of secondary importance.50
Actually it would appear that the importance of the rule favoring
early vesting has not been relegated to a position of secondary impor-
tance; rather all that has been done is to re-evaluate the relative effects
of the expression of testator's intent and the presumed intent reflected
in the construction rule. A simple case, viz., testator gives a life estate
with remainder to his surviving children, will still be governed by this
rule and the children's future interests found indefeasibly vested. The
Wisconsin court, in Estate of Ferdinand, recognized the fact that the
quantity of expressed intent could vary.
There (in the case of In re Moran's Will) the court thought
there was nothing appearing upon the face of the will to indi-
cate that the words of survivorship referred to any other event
than that event (death of the life tenant). However the language
of the will in Will of Reimers,52 supra, is stronger to support
vesting than the language used in the Moran will; but neverthe-
less we held that survivorship was determined and the remainder
vested at the death of the testator. (Parenthesis added.) 53
As a result of this relaxed attitude toward the requirement of ex-
pression of intent, all will construction cases will have to be carefully
examined for evidence of testator's intent, both in the dispositive lan-
guage used and in the facts surrounding the testator at his death and
at the execution of the will.
STEPHEN F. SCHREITER
50 Note, 1963 Wis. L. REv. 494.51 ln re Moran's Will, supra note 45.
52242 Wis. 233, 7 N.W. 2d 857 (1943).
537 Wis. 2d 577, 584, 97 N.W. 2d 414, 418 (1959).
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